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Abstract. Today’s distributed systems need runtime error detection to catch
errors arising from software bugs, hardware errors, or unexpected operating
conditions. A prominent class of error detection techniques operates in a
stateful manner, i.e., it keeps track of the state of the application being
monitored and then matches state-based rules. Large-scale distributed
applications generate a high volume of messages that can overwhelm the
capacity of a stateful detection system. An existing approach to handle this is to
randomly sample the messages and process the subset. However, this approach,
leads to non-determinism with respect to the detection system’s view of what
state the application is in. This in turn leads to degradation in the quality of
detection. We present an intelligent sampling and Hidden Markov Model
(HMM)-based technique to select the messages and states that the detection
system processes such that the non-determinism is minimized. We also present
a mechanism for selecting computationally intensive rules to match based on
the likelihood of detecting an error if a rule is completely matched. We
demonstrate the techniques in a detection system called Monitor applied to a
J2EE distributed online banking application. We empirically evaluate the
performance of Monitor under different load conditions and compare it to a
previous system called Pinpoint.

1

Introduction

1.1

Motivation

Increased deployment of high-speed computer networks has made distributed
applications ubiquitous in today’s connected world. Many of these distributed
applications provide critical functionality with real-time requirements. These require
online error detection functionality for errors at the application level.
Error detection can be classified as stateless or stateful detection. In the former,
detection is done on individual messages by matching certain characteristics of the
message, for example, finding specific signatures in the payload of network packets.
A more powerful approach is stateful error detection, in which the error detection
system builds up knowledge of the application state by collecting information from
multiple application messages. The stateful error detection system then matches
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behavior-based rules, based on the application’s state rather than on instantaneous
information. For simplicity, we refer to error detection as just detection in this paper.
Stateful detection is looked upon as a powerful mechanism for building dependable
distributed systems [1][12]. However, scaling a stateful detection system with
increasing rate of messages is a challenge. The increasing rate may happen due to a
greater number of application components and increasing load from these
components. The stress on the detection system is due to the increased processing
load of tracking the application state and performing rule matching. The rules can be
heavy-duty and can impose large overhead for matching. Thus the stateful detection
system has to be designed such that the resource usage, primarily computation and
memory, is minimized. Simply throwing more hardware at the problem is not enough
because applications also scale up demanding more from the detection system.
In prior work, we have presented Monitor [12] which provides stateful detection by
observing the messages exchanged between application components. Monitor is
provided with a representation of the application (or protocol) behavior using a finite
state machine (FSM) along with a set of normal behavior rules. A simple example of
a rule for a three-tier e-commerce system is that a request submitted to authenticate a
purchase request should complete within a user-specified time bound. Monitor uses
an observer model whereby it observes the inter-component interactions, but does not
have any knowledge of the internal state of a component. Monitor performs two
primary tasks on observing a message. First, it deduces the application state by
performing a state transition based on the observed message. Second, it performs rule
matching for the rules associated with the particular state and observed message.
We have observed that Monitor has a breaking point in terms of the rate of
messages it has to process [12]. Beyond this breaking point, there is a sharp drop in
accuracy or rise in latency (i.e., the time spent in rule matching) due to an overload
caused by the high incoming rate of messages. All detection systems that perform
stateful detection at the application level are expected to have such a breaking point,
though the rate of messages at which each system breaks will be different. For
example, the stateful network intrusion detection system (NIDS) Snort running on a
general-purpose CPU can process traffic up to 500 Mbps [21]. A higher traffic rate
exhausts its CPU and memory resources leading to packet losses and an increase of
false alarms. For Monitor, we have observed through experimentation that the
breaking point on a standard Linux box is 100 packets/sec [12].
We have shown in previous work [13] that we can reduce the processing load in
Monitor by randomly sampling the incoming messages. The load per unit time in a
detection system is given by the incoming message rate × processing overhead per
message. Thus, processing only a subset of messages by sampling them reduces the
overall load. However, sampling introduces non-determinism in the sense that the
Monitor is no longer aware of the exact state the application is in. In sampling mode,
messages are either sampled (and processed) or dropped. When a message is dropped,
Monitor loses track of which state the application is in. This causes inaccuracies in
selecting the rules to match since the rules are based on the application state and the
observed message. This leads to lower quality of detection, as measured by accuracy
(the fraction of actual errors that is detected) and precision (the complement of false
alarms).
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3

Our contributions

We propose an intelligent sampling technique to reduce the non-determinism caused
by random sampling in stateful detection systems. This technique is based on the
observation that in an application’s FSM, a message type can be seen as a state
transition in multiple states. For example, a call to the addressLookUp function to
look up the address information of an e-commerce site’s consumer may be made from
different components. Therefore, different message types differ in their ability to
pinpoint which possible states the application is in. Computation of this
discriminating property of the messages is done offline from the FSM of the
application, which in turn is automatically generated through training traces. With
intelligent sampling, Monitor observes all messages at runtime, but selectively
samples and processes the messages with a high discriminating property, thereby
limiting the non-determinism.
Even with the proper selection of messages, there is remaining non-determinism
about the application state. Therefore, we propose a Hidden Markov Model (HMM)based technique to estimate the likelihood of the different application states given an
observed sequence of messages and perform rule matching for only the more likely
states. This involves prior training of the model with representative application traces,
a challenge but nevertheless used in many detection systems [5][8]. We show that the
two techniques⎯intelligent sampling and HMM-based filtering⎯make Monitor scale
to an application with a high load, with only a small degradation in detection quality.
For the evaluation, we use a distributed J2EE online banking application, the
Duke’s Bank application [15], running on Glassfish, the open source Sun Application
Server [16]. Glassfish is comprised of a web container, an EJB container, and a backend database. We inject errors in pairs of the combination (component, method),
where ‘component’ can be a Java Server Page (JSP), servlet, or Enterprise Java Bean
(EJB), and ‘method’ is a function call in the component. The injected errors can cause
failures in the web interaction in which this combination is touched, for example, by
delaying the completion of the web interaction or by prematurely terminating a web
interaction without the expected response to the user. Our comparison points are
Pinpoint [8] for detecting anomalies in the structure of web interactions and Monitor
with random sampling [13].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present background
material on stateful detection. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the intelligent sampling
and HMM-based application state estimation algorithms. In Section 5 we explain our
experimental testbed and in Section 6, the experiments. In Section 7 we review related
work and in Section 9 we present the conclusions and limitations of this work.

2

Background

In previous work we developed Monitor, a framework for online error detection in
distributed applications [12]. Online implies the detection happens when the
application is executing. Monitor is said to verify the application’s components by
observing the messages exchanged between the components. Monitor performs error
detection under the principle of black-box instrumentation, i.e., the application does
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not have to be changed to allow Monitor to detect errors. This permits error detection
to be applied to third party applications where source code is unavailable.
2.1

Fault Model

Monitor can detect any error that manifests itself as a deviation from the
application’s model and expected behavior that is given to the Monitor as input—a
Finite State Machine (FSM) and a set of application-level behavior-based rules. We
define a web interaction as the set of inter-component messages that are caused by a
user request. The end point of the interaction is marked by the response back to the
user. In the context of component-based web applications, an FSM is used to pinpoint
deviations in the structure of the observed web interactions, while rules are used to
determine deviations from the expected normal behavior of application’s components.
2.2

Stateful Detection

Monitor is provided a representation of the application behavior through an FSM
that can be generated from a human-specified description (e.g., a protocol
specification), or from analysis of application observations (e.g., function call traces,
as done here). Recent techniques for deriving the logic of low-level programs through
an FSM have been proposed in [19]. In our current system, transitions are caused by
method invocations on components and method returns. In addition, a behavior-based
rulebase is provided to Monitor. Rules can be derived from the application
specification or specified from QoS conditions required by the application’s
administrator. These rules can verify delays in components, or values of state
variables. We explain more about rule types in Section 2.4 but the issue of how to
generate appropriate rules is outside the scope of this paper.
When observing an application component’s message, Monitor performs two
primary tasks. First, it performs a state transition according to the FSM and the
observed message. This allows Monitor to infer the current state of the application.
Second, it matches rules associated with the particular state of the application and the
observed message. If it is determined that the application does not satisfy a rule, an
alarm is signaled.
Monitor

HMM
Packets

Intelligent
Sampling
Random
Sampling

Rule
Database

FSM
Database

Packet Capturer
Engine
μ
msg

State
Maintainer
Engine

ω

Rule
Matching
Engine

Alarms

Fig. 1. Monitor architecture. One-sided and two-sided arrows show unidirectional and
bidirectional flow of information respectively. Gray boxes indicate new components added to
Monitor in this work.
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Monitor architecture consists of three primary components, as shown in Fig. 1 the
PacketCapturer engine, the StateMaintainer engine, and the RuleMatching engine.
Each component executes in a separate thread. Other components of the architecture
are described in [12].
The PacketCapturer engine is in charge of capturing the messages exchanged
between the application components, which could be done through middleware
forwarding (as done here) or through network assist (such as, port forwarding or using
a broadcast medium). When Monitor receives a rate of incoming messages close to
the maximum rate that it can handle, the PacketCapturer is responsible for
activating a sampling mechanism to reduce the workload for state transition and rule
matching. In previous work [13] we showed that a random sampling approach helps
in reducing Monitor’s workload when experiencing high incoming rates of messages.
We define the term sampling here as we will use it for the rest of the paper. An
incoming message into Monitor may be sampled, meaning, it will be processed
further with the two important steps mentioned above (performing a state transition
and matching rules based on that message), or it may be dropped. In random
sampling, messages are sampled randomly without looking at the type or content of
the message, which makes it a lightweight operation. In [12] we have observed that
under non-sampling conditions, Monitor’s accuracy and precision suffer when the rate
of incoming messages reaches a particular point which is denoted as Rth. Therefore,
random sampling is activated at any rate R > Rth, in which Monitor drops messages
uniformly with a rate of one every (R / (R − Rth) ) messages.
Sampled messages are passed to the StateMaintainer engine in order to
perform state transitions according to the application’s FSM. For each received
message, the StateMaintainer engine is in charge of determining which states
the application may be in. This is called the state vector and represented by ω. Here,
the events are messages from the application that are observed at Monitor. When
Monitor is in non-sampling mode, the state vector typically contains only one state
since Monitor has an almost-complete view of the events generated in the application.
Therefore it can infer the actual application’s state, giving |ω|=1. However, when
sampling mode is activated, Monitor loses track of the actual state of the application
since it is not observing every event generated by the application. In this scenario, ω
ends up with a set of the possible states in which the application can be in, given the
number of dropped messages. Once a message m is sampled, ω is updated. This is
performed by observing (in the FSM) the new state (or states) to where the
application could have moved, from each state in ω given m. We define this
mechanism as pruning the state vector and it is explained in further detail in Section
3.1. Typically, when ω is pruned, its size is reduced.
The RuleMatching engine is responsible for matching rules associated with the
state(s) in ω.
A challenge in Monitor, when performing random sampling, is to maintain high
levels of accuracy and precision even while dropping messages. Two cases illustrate
this degradation. First, if ω does not contain the correct application state Si, and a
failure occurs in Si, Monitor will have a missed alarm since no rules will be applied to
Si. This leads to a reduction in accuracy. Second, if ω contains a large number of
incorrect states—states where the application is not in—false alarms will increase.
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Due to the randomness of the sampling approach proposed in [13], we obtained a
maximum accuracy of 0.7 when detecting failures in TRAM, a reliable multicast
protocol. Systems running critical services often demand higher levels of accuracy
while having low detection latency.
2.3

Building FSM from Traces

We build an FSM for the Duke’s Bank Application by obtaining traces from the
application when it is exercised with a given workload. A state Si in the FSM is
defined as a tuple (component, method). In the rest of the paper we use the term
subcomponent to denote the tuple (component, method). The rationale for this level of
granularity is to be able to pinpoint performance problems or errors in particular
methods, rather than only in components. A state change is caused by a call or return
event within two subcomponents. We create the FSM by imposing a workload on the
application which consists of as nearly an exhaustive list of transactions supported in
the application as possible. We cannot claim this is exhaustive since it is manually
done and no rigorous mechanism is used to guarantee completeness.
The FSM for Duke’s Bank has 31 states and 62 events (2×31 because of calls and
returns). When we generate application traces, no error injection is performed and we
assume that design faults in the application, if any, are not activated, an assumption
made in many learning-based detection systems [5][8][22].
2.4

Rule Types

In previous work [12] we developed a syntax for rule specification for messagebased applications. We now extend the syntax to be more flexible so that it can be
applied more naturally to RPC-style component-based applications.
For detecting performance problems in distributed applications, we use a set of
temporal rules that characterize allowable response time of subcomponents. The
response times can be arrived at by various means: (1) a protocol specification may
specify that a component should acknowledge or reply to a request made from another
component in a bounded interval of time, (2) a Service Level Agreement (SLA) may
specify QoS constraints for web services or service components, (3) models based on
performance analysis tools, such as Magpie [7], can be used to derive normal
response time of elements in component-based applications. The other main type of
rules we use is to verify that values of state variables lie within specified ranges, e.g.,
number of failed authentication attempts must not exceed a threshold.

3

Handling High Streaming Rates: Intelligent Sampling

3.1

Sampling in Monitor

With increasing incoming message rates at Monitor from the application
components, its overall workload increases leading to higher latency of detection. To
maintain an acceptable latency, Monitor chooses to process only a fraction of the
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incoming messages. When a message arrives at the PacketCapturer engine, a
sampling mechanism is used to decide whether to pass the message to the
StateMaintainer or not, i.e., whether to sample or to drop the message. If a
message is sampled, it is then processed by the StateMaintainer to prune the
state vector, and then by the RuleMatching engine for rule matching.
When a message is dropped, Monitor cannot determine the correct application state,
resulting in an undesirable condition, which we call state non-determinism. As an
example, consider an FSM fragment in Fig. 2.. Suppose that the application is in state
SA at time t1, and that a message is dropped. From the FSM, Monitor determines that
the application can be in state SB or state SC, so the state vector ω = {SB, SC}. If
another message is dropped at time t2, ω grows to {SB, SD, SE, SF}. Depending on the
number of consecutive dropped messages, the state vector can grow to a maximum of
the total number of states in the FSM.
m2

…

m1

SB

SA
m6

SC

…

m3

SD

m4

SE

…

m4

SF

…
time

t1

t2

t3

Fig. 2. A fragment of a Finite State Machine (FSM) to demonstrate non-determinism
introduced by sampling.

Monitor’s RuleMatching engine matches rules for all the states in ω. To avoid
matching rules in incorrect states, Monitor prunes invalid states from the state vector
once a message is sampled. For example, if the current state vector is {SB, SC} and
message m2 is sampled, the state vector is reduced to {SB} because this is the only
possible transition from any state in the state vector given the event m2 (assuming that
the sampled message is not erroneous).
A large state vector increases the computational cost since a larger number of
potentially expensive rules have to be matched leading to high detection latency. For
example, an expensive rule we encounter in practice is checking consistency of
multiple database tables. Worse, a large and inaccurate state vector degrades the
quality of detection through an increase in false alarms and missed alarms. Our goal is
then to keep the state vector size bounded so that the detection latency does not
exceed a threshold (Lth), and the detection quality stays acceptable.
3.2

Intelligent Sampling Approach

We hypothesize that sampling based on some inherent property of messages from
the FSM can lead to a reduction in the state vector size when pruning is performed.
We have observed that messages in the application have different properties with
respect to the different transitions in the FSM that they appear in. For example, some
messages can appear in multiple transitions while other appears in only one. Suppose
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for example that state vector ω = {SB, SC} at time t2 following Fig. 2.. If m3 is
sampled, StateMaintainer would prune ω to {SD}, while if m4 is sampled, ω
would be pruned to {SE, SF}. Thus, the fact that m3 appears in one transition while m4
appears in two makes a difference to the resulting state vector. We say therefore that
m3 has a more desired property than m4 in terms of sampling.
We use an intelligent sampling approach whereby all incoming messages are
observed, and a subset of messages with a desirable property is sampled; others are
dropped. A message is observed by determining its type at the application level,
which determines the transition in the FSM. For our application, type is given by the
combination (component, method, “call or return”). Sampling a message has the same
definition as in Section 2.2, i.e., performing state transition and rule matching with the
message.
Let us denote by dm, discriminative size, the number of times a message m appears
in a state transition to different states in the FSM. In the intelligent sampling
approach, a message with a small dm is desired. The selection of such messages is
implemented in Monitor through a greedy algorithm which we describe next.
3.3

Intelligent Sampling Algorithm

To guarantee that the rate of messages processed by Monitor is less than Rth, it
samples n messages in a window of m messages, where n < m and the fraction n/m is
determined by the incoming message rate. Now, given a window of m messages,
which particular messages should Monitor sample? Ideally, Monitor should wait for n
messages with a discriminative size less than a particular threshold dth. However,
since we do not know in advance what the discriminative sizes of messages in the
future will be, Monitor could end up with no sampled messages at all by the end of
the window. To address this, Monitor tracks the number of messages seen in the
window and the number of messages already sampled, in counters numMsgs and
numSampled respectively. If Monitor reaches a point where the number of remaining
messages in the window (m − numMsgs) is equal to the number of messages that it
still needs to sample (n − numSampled) all the remaining messages (m − numMsgs)
are sampled without looking at their discriminative sizes. We call this point the last
resort point. Before reaching the last resort point, Monitor samples only those
messages with discriminative sizes less than dth; after that, it samples all remaining
messages in the window. This approach relies on a concurrent process that tracks the
incoming message rate and triggers a recalculation of m and n when a significant
change is detected.
Fig. 3. shows the IntelligentSampling algorithm. The algorithm runs for a
window of m messages and the main while loop in lines 5-16 examines m messages,
while the condition in line 6 guarantees that only n messages are sampled. If the last
resort point is never reached (say the desired messages arrive early in the window),
the algorithm always runs lines 7-11. Here discriminative size of messages is
examined and those with dm < dth are sampled. Each message is looked up in a precomputed static table which has dm values for all the messages. Otherwise, as a result
of reaching the last resort point, it runs lines 12-14 where all messages are sampled.

How To Keep Your Head Above Water While Detecting Errors

9

IntelligentSampling decides whether to sample or drop a
message in a window of messages.
Input: n: the number of messages that have to be sampled; m:
size of the window of messages from which we sample n
messages; table: table with each message and its corresponding
discriminative size; dth: threshold for the discriminative size of a
message.
Variables: currentMsg: current captured message; numMsgs:
number of messages seen in m; numSampled: number of sampled
messages; size: discriminative size of a message
IntelligentSampling(n, m, table, dth):
1. currentMsg ← getNextMessage( )
2. numMsgs ← 0
3. numSampled ← 0
4. size ← 0
5. while (numMsgs < m) then
6.
if ( numSampled < n ) then
7.
if ( n – numSampled < m – numMsgs ) then
8.
size ← discriminativeSize(currentMsg)
9.
if ( size < dth in table) then
10.
SampleMessage(currentMsg)
11.
numSampled ← numSampled + 1
12.
else
13.
SampleMessage (currentMsg)
14.
numSampled ← numSampled + 1
15. currentMsg ← getNextMessage( )
16. numMsgs ← numMsgs + 1
17. return

Fig. 3. Pseudo-code for intelligent sampling algorithm.

The function SampleMessage passes the message to the StateMaintainer
for further pruning of the state vector.
For a window of m messages, the computational cost of this algorithm is O(Km),
where K is the cost of looking up the discriminative size of a message. We
implemented table by using a hash-table so the expected time of this search is O(1),
giving an overall complexity O(m). The space complexity is O(M), where M is the
count of types of messages in the system.

4

Reducing Non-Determinism: HMM-based State Vector
Reduction

There are two remaining problems when pruning the state vector with the intelligent
sampling approach. First, when a message is sampled and the state vector is pruned,
the size of the new state vector can still be large making detection costly and
inaccurate. This situation arises if the FSM has a large number of states and the FSM
is highly connected, or if highly discriminative messages are not seen in a window.
The second disadvantage is that if the sampled message is incorrect, Monitor can end
up with an incorrect state vector—a state vector that does not contain the actual
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application’s state. An incorrect message is one that is valid according to the FSM,
but is incorrect given the current state. For example, in Fig. 2., if state vector ω = {SB,
SC}, only messages m2, m3, and m4 are correct messages. Incorrect messages can be
seen due to a buggy component, e.g., a component that makes an unexpected call in
an error condition. To overcome these difficulties, we propose the use of a Hidden
Markov Model to determine probabilistically the current application state.
4.1

Hidden Markov Model

A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is an extension of a Markov Model where the
states in the model are not observable. In a particular state, an outcome, which is
observable, is generated according to an associated probability distribution.
The main challenge of Monitor, when handling non-determinism, is to determine
the correct state of the application when only a subset of messages is sampled. This
phenomenon can be modeled with an HMM because the correct state of the
application is hidden from Monitor while the messages are observable. Therefore, we
use an HMM to determine the probability of the application being in each of its states.
In a subsequent stage, Monitor prunes states from the state vector that have low
probability values.
An HMM [14] is characterized by the set of states, a set of observation symbols, the
state transition probability distribution A, the observation probability distribution B
(given a state i, what is the probability of observation j), and the initial state
probability distribution π. We use λ = (A, B, π) as a compact notation for the HMM.
We used the Baum-Welch algorithm [14] to estimate HMM parameters to model the
Duke’s Bank application. The HMM is trained with a set of traces from the
application which is obtained by imposing a load of concurrent users for about 5
minutes. These are the same set of traces used to build the application FSM. We
attempt to produce a complete list of all the web interactions that can occur in the
application. The Baum-Welch algorithm starts with a uniform probability distribution
for all states and edges and refines it using the traces.
4.2

Algorithm for Reducing the State Vector using HMM

We have implemented the ReduceStateVector algorithm (Fig. 4) for reducing
the state vector using an HMM. When Monitor samples a message, it asks the HMM
for the k most probable application states. Monitor then intersects the previous state
vector with the set of k most probable states. Then an updated state vector is
computed from the FSM using pruning (as defined in Section 2.2), i.e., by asking the
FSM that given the set of states from the intersection and the sampled message, what
are the possible next states.
The HMM is implemented in Monitor in the frontend thread, the
PacketCapturer. Thus, the HMM observes all messages since they are needed to
build complete sequences of observations.
The ReduceStateVector algorithm consists of three steps:
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─ Step 1: Calculate what is the probability that, after seeing a sequence of
messages O, the application is in each of the possible states s1, … sN? This is
expressed as P(qt = si | O, λ). This step produces a vector of probabilities μt
(lines 1−3).
─ Step 2: Sort the vector μt by the probability values. This produces a new vector
of probabilities αt (line 4).
─ Step 3: Compute a new state vector ωt+1 as the intersection of the current state
vector ωt and the top k elements in αt. By using a small k, Monitor is able to
reduce the state vector to few states. For example, taking the example in Fig. 2.,
if ωt = {SB, SD, SE, SF} and αt = [SD, SE,…, SA], by taking the top k=2 in αt the
new state vector ωt+1 would be {SD, SE}. Notice that if the intersection of ωt and
αt is null, we take the union of the two sets. This is a safe choice because having
the intersection of ωt and αt equal to null implies that either the HMM or ωt is
incorrect. This step is executed in lines 5-11.
The time complexity of the algorithm is proportional to the time in computing P(qt =
si |O, λ) for all the states, the time to sort the array μt, and the time to compute the
intersection of ωt and the top k elements in αt. The vector μt can be computed in time
O(N3T), where N is the number of states in the HMM (and the FSM), and T is the
length of the observation sequence O. Sorting μt can be performed in O(N log N), and
the intersection of ωt and αt[1…k] can be performed in O(Nk). Hence, the overall time
complexity is O(N3T + N log N + Nk). In practice, the last factor tends to be N because
we select a small constant for k (1 or 2).
ReduceStateVector computes a new state vector based on:
the HMM, an observation sequence and a previous state vector.
Input: λ: Hidden Markov Model; O: observation sequence O =
{O1, O2,…,Ot}; ωt: application’ state vector at time t; k: Filtering
criteria for the number of probabilities estimated by the HMM
(this is the minimum size for the new state vector ωt+1).
Output: ωt+1
Variables: μt: probability vector μt = {p1, p2,…,pN}, where pi = P(
qt = si | O, λ ), for all i in S={s1,…,sN} (the states in the FSM) and
qt is the state at time t; αt: sorted μt.
ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ωt, k):
1. μt ← ∅
2. For each i in S
3.
Add P( qt = si | O, λ ) to μt
4. αt ← sort(μt) by pi
5. I ← ∅
6. I ← ωt ∩ αt[1…k]
7. if ( I = ∅ ) then
8.
ωt+1 ← ωt ∪ αt[1…k]
9. else
10.
ωt+1 ← I
11. return ωt+1

Fig. 4. Pseudo-code for reducing state vector using HMM’s estimate of probability
of each application state.
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Fig. 5 shows points in time when the algorithm is invoked in StateMaintainer.
FSMLookup(ω, n) calculates the new state vector from ω given that n consecutive
messages have been dropped (as explained in Section 3.1).
Time
..
.

Operations in Monitor
(Sampled messages. Last sampled
message at time t10.)

t11

Dropped message
ωt10 ← ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ωt10, k)
ωt11 ← FSMLookup(ωt10 , 1 dropped message)

..
.
t16

(Dropped messages. Last dropped
message at time t15.)
m16 is sampled
ωt15 ← ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ωt15, k)
ωt16 is pruned from ωt15 given m16

Fig. 5. Example of points in time when the ReduceStateVector algorithm is invoked.

5

Experimental Testbed

5.1

J2EE Application

Many of today’s distributed applications, such as e-commerce and online banking,
are implemented using the J2EE standard. We use the J2EE Duke’s Bank Application
[15] as our experimental testbed. Duke’s Bank provides user functionalities such as
accessing account information and performing transactions, and is representative of a
medium-sized component-based application. It is composed of 4 web components
(servlets and Java Server Pages) and 6 Enterprise Java Beans (EJB) components.
Duke’s Bank is run on Glassfish v2 [16], the open-source application server from Sun
Microsystems. Glassfish has a package called CallFlow that provides a central
function for Monitor—a unique ID is assigned to each web interaction. It also
provides caller and called component and method, without needing any application
change.
5.2

Web-users Emulator

To evaluate our solutions in diverse scenarios such as high user request rates and
multiple types of workload, we wrote WebStressor, a web interactions emulator.
WebStressor takes different user profile traces and replays them by sending each
message in the traces to the tested detection systems. Each profile trace contains
sequences of web interactions that would be seen in CallFlow when a user of
Duke’s Bank application is executing multiple operations. WebStressor has as
configuration parameters: the number of concurrent users, the user think-time, and the
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ramp-up delay (the time between two successive users starting to interact with the
system). For all the experiments, we wanted to create a specific number of users at a
fast rate and impose a high load on the systems. Therefore, we used a random thinktime between 1 and 5 seconds and a ramp-up delay of 200 milliseconds, which are
relatively small values compared to say the TPC-W benchmark. WebStressor also has
error injection capabilities which are explained in Section 6.5.
5.3

Pinpoint Implementation

Pinpoint [8] proposes an approach for tracing paths through multiple components,
triggered by user requests. A Probabilistic Context Free Grammar (PCFG) is used to
model normal path behavior and to detect anomalies whenever a path’s structure does
not fit the PCFG. A PCFG has productions represented in Chomsky Normal Form
(CNF) and each production is assigned a probability after a training phase. We call
this implementation Pinpoint-PCFG in the paper.
Pinpoint-PCFG has a training phase and an online detection phase. We use the
implementation of Inside-Outside Algorithm (IO) from Brown University [17] for the
estimation of the production probabilities to generate a stochastic CFG. PinpointPCFG is trained using the same traces from Duke’s Bank that are used to build the
FSM and to train the HMM.
The online part of Pinpoint-PCFG is implemented using the Cocke-YoungerKasami (CYK) parser algorithm [17], to parse the sequence of messages to determine
the probability of deriving a web interaction. The probability of deriving a web
interaction j from Pinpoint-PCFG is the product of the probabilities of productions
used in the derivation. In our implementation, we apply a transformation to the raw
probabilities to be able to work with small probability values. Let the web interaction
j be derived through n productions and probability of production i be pi. We calculate
a measure Mj for the web interaction j by the following equation:
n

M j = − log ∏ pi .
i =1

Note that, the higher the value of Mj for an observed web interaction, the lower is
the probability of seeing that web interaction according to the PCFG model. We
compute Mj for each web interaction encountered and compare it to a threshold (Mth);
if Mj is greater then Mth, the interaction is marked as anomalous. In our experiments,
we empirically determine the Mth value for optimal performance of Pinpoint-PCFG
(Section 6.7).

6

Experiments and Results

In this section we report experiments to evaluate the performance of Monitor under
different loads and for different types of injected errors. We also provide a
comparative evaluation with the Pinpoint-PCFG algorithm. When we refer to
Monitor, we mean baseline Monitor [12] with the two techniques intelligent sampling
and HMM. The machines used have 4 processors, each an Intel Xeon 3.4 GHz with
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1024 MB of memory and 1024 KB of L1 cache. All experiments are run with
exclusive access to the machine. We show 95% confidence intervals for some
representative plots, but not all, to keep the graphs readable.
6.1

Measuring the Benefits of Sampling

Baseline
Sampling

80
60
40
20
0
0

1
2
3
4
Elapsed Time (min)

5

1

Random Sampling
30
20
10
0

30
20
10
0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Discrete Time
Intelligent Sampling

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Discrete Time

(a)

(b)

CDF of size of ω

100

State Vector Size

120

State Vector Size

Rule Matching Time (sec)

Our first experiment is aimed to validate if sampling is needed in Monitor for
practical user loads. We stress the application with a load of 20 concurrent users and
measure the average rule matching time in Monitor-baseline and Monitor with
sampling. Rule matching time is defined as the difference in time from when a
message arrives into Monitor to when matching the rules corresponding to this
message completes. The measurement is done every 2 seconds in a run of 5 minutes.
Fig. 6.(a) shows the results for this experiment. In Monitor-baseline, the time
increases considerably to the order of minutes as the experiment continues. The trend
will be monotonically increasing since the queue is filled faster than it is being
drained. We observe that with the sampling scheme, rule matching time is kept
approximately constant. This empirically demonstrates the utility of sampling.

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

Random Sampling
Intelligent Sampling
2
4
6
Pruned State Vector Size

8

(c)

Fig. 6. Performance results when comparing Monitor baseline, random sampling and intelligent
sampling. (a) Average rule matching time for Monitor baseline (without sampling) and Monitor
with sampling with 20 concurrent users; (b) Sampled values of state vector ω for Monitor with
random and intelligent sampling; (c) CDF for the pruned state vector ω with random and
intelligent sampling.

6.2

Adjusting the Sampling Rate

When experiencing high incoming rates, Monitor starts sampling messages to avoid
the latency exceeding a threshold Lth. Beyond a certain incoming rate, the latency in
matching rules increases continuously from milliseconds to minutes and we would
like the Monitor to operate at a rate less than where this occurs. We call this
Monitor’s threshold rate and denote it as Rth. We observe this threshold in Monitor
when WebStressor emulates approximately 3 concurrent users in Duke’s Bank
application, which we use for the experiments as the trigger for sampling in Monitor.
This corresponds to Rth of 52 messages/sec on average. Due to the artificially low
think time and ramp-up time, 3 users in our experiments are equivalent to a higher
number of actual users. Also 24 concurrent users define the upper end of our
experimental range, not the range of capabilities for either Monitor or Pinpoint-PCFG.

How To Keep Your Head Above Water While Detecting Errors

15

Sampling rate Rs for an incoming rate R is given by:
Rs =

Rth
, R > Rth .
R

The performance of intelligent sampling is affected by the calculated sampling rate.
The algorithm samples n messages in a window of m messages. Therefore, Monitor
needs a fraction n/m that approximates Rs. We call this fraction the sampling factor.
The discretization of the rate causes a discretization error for different number of
concurrent users as shown in Table 1..
The selection of m in the sampling factor is a critical step since it affects the
performance of intelligent sampling. If m is greater than the size of a web interaction,
intelligent sampling may, in pathological cases, drop all the messages in the web
interaction. Then a fault in the web interaction will not be detected. Therefore, to
achieve low missed alarms, the value for m should be small, say the size of the
smallest web interaction, which is 6 for the Duke’s Bank application. However a
small size for m causes a large discretization error and curtails the ability of Monitor
to select discriminating messages from within a large window. As a balance, we
assign m=8 for the experiments. Table 1 shows the sampling factor values for
different number of concurrent users, which maps to different message rates.
Table 1. Sampling Factors calculated according to the number of number of concurrent users
Concurrent Users
4
8
12
16
20
24
Messages / sec.
70.00 118.97 194.28 236.86 314.38 362.74
Sampling rate
0.741 0.436 0.267 0.219 0.165 0.143
Sampling factor
6/8
4/8
2/8
2/8
1/8
1/8
Discretization error 0.01
0.06
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.02

6.3

Benefits of Intelligent Sampling

We run experiments to verify our hypothesis that intelligent sampling helps in
reducing the size of the state vector ω. For this, we run WebStressor with a fixed
moderate user load (8 concurrent users) and with no error injection. This load results
in a sampling factor 4/8. Monitor is run individually in random sampling (RS) mode,
and in intelligent sampling (IS) mode. When a message is dropped, ω increases or
stays constant. When a message is sampled, ω is pruned and it is passed to the
RuleMatching engine.
In each mode, we obtained 3337 sample values of ω’s size. Fig. 6.(b) shows 100
snapshots of these values for RS and IS modes. Here the size of ω is shown for every
message arriving at Monitor. The high-peaks pattern that we observe in RS mode is
due to the deficiency of random sampling in selecting messages with small
discriminative size. In contrast we do not observe this pattern in IS mode, because it
preferentially
samples
the
discriminating
messages,
allowing
the
StateMaintainer to produce smaller pruned state vectors ω. We notice that in
RS mode, ω’s size can reach 31 which is the number of states in the FSM, whereas in
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8
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Random Sampling
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Rule Matching Time (sec)

Rule Matching Time (sec)

IS mode, ω’s size is bounded to 14. Also, ω’s size can increase even when sampling
is being done, but this happens less often with IS due to its ability to sample suitable
messages.
25
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5
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Random Sampling
Intelligent Sampling
200
400
600
Messages / sec

(b)

Fig. 7. Rule matching time for random sampling (RS) and intelligent sampling (IS) modes
under sampling rates of 0.75 and 0.25 in figures (a) and (b) respectively.

We observe also in Fig. 6.(b) that for IS mode, ω’s size is sometimes kept 1
consecutively for 4 messages. We can observe the occurrence of this pattern once in
the range of samples 10−20, and two times in the range of samples 20−50. In the
Duke’s Bank application’s FSM, the most frequent discriminative size, within the 62
types of messages, is 1. Therefore, as the intelligent sampling algorithm tries to
sample these messages preferentially, it is likely to repeatedly attain ω of size 1. Our
ultimate goal, regardless of the sampling algorithm, is ω of size 1 since the
application in reality is in one state at any point in time.
Next, we measure ω’s size only after it is pruned. Recall that the pruned state vector
ω is the one used for rule instantiation and matching. Hence, it is at this point that it is
critical to have a small ω for improved detection quality and latency. Fig. 6.(c) shows
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the observed values of ω’s size. In IS
mode, ω’s size of 1 has a higher frequency of occurrence (about 83%) than in RS
mode (60%). In contrast, all ω’s size values > 1 have higher frequency of occurrence
in RS than in IS. After being pruned, ω can have a maximum size of 7. This is due to
the nature of Duke’s Bank application in which the maximum discriminative size of a
message is 7.
As more direct proof of the benefit of IS, we measure the average rule matching
time for IS and RS modes. Fig. 7.(a)−(b)shows the average rule matching time under
two sampling rate conditions: 0.75 and 0.25. The set of rules is fixed to 80%, and no
error injection is performed. The HMM-based state vector reduction is also disabled
to avoid including its overhead in these measurements.
The average rule matching time for Monitor with IS is lower than for RS for all
cases. Even though IS incurs the additional overhead of determining the type of
messages and looking up its discriminative size, the reduction of the state vector size
more than compensates for it. For a sampling rate of 0.25, for IS the rule matching
time remains negligible (< 1 sec) for incoming message rates less than 350
messages/sec. This supports the fact that Monitor’s detection delay is in the order of
milliseconds for up to 24 concurrent users (equivalent to 362.74 messages/sec).
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Definition of Performance Metrics

We introduce the metrics that we use to evaluate detection quality. Let W denote the
entire set of web interactions generated in the application in one experimental run. For
W, we collect the following variables, I: out of W, the web interactions where faults
were injected; D: out of W, the web interactions in which Monitor detected a failure;
C: out of I, the web interactions in which Monitor detected a failure (these are the
correct detections).
Based on these variables, we calculate two metrics:
Accuracy = |C| / |I|; Precision = |C| / |D|
Accuracy expresses how well the detection system is able to identify the web
interactions in which problems occurred, while precision is a measure of the inverse
of false alarms in the system.
Another performance metric is the latency of detection. Let Ti denote the time when
a fault is injected and Td the time when the failure caused by the injected fault is
detected by the detection system. We define detection latency as Td – Ti. When a
delay δ is injected (emulating a performance problem in a component of the
application), δ is subtracted from the total time since it represents only a characteristic
of the injected fault and not the quality of the detection system.
It may be useful to identify a problem in a web interaction even before the web
interaction finishes. For example, if during the sequence of calls between components
in a web interaction, we detect a problem in a subcomponent, we may want to prevent
subsequent subcomponents from being called. This can help in preventing the
propagation of error to subsequent subcomponents and in diagnosing the root cause of
the problem. If a detection system achieves detection before the web interaction
completes, we say the system has a pre-detection latency, else we refer to it as a postdetection latency. In Pinpoint-PCFG, a complete web interaction must be observed to
perform error detection, while in Monitor detection is performed without needing to
look at the entire web interaction. Therefore, Pinpoint-PCFG always has postdetection, while Monitor may have pre- or post-detection.
6.5

Error Injection Model

Errors are injected by WebStressor at runtime when mimicking concurrent users.
This results in errors in the application traces which are fed to the detection systems.
We inject four kinds of errors that occur in real operating scenarios:
1. Response delay: a delay d is selected randomly between 100 msec and 500 msec,
and is injected in a particular subcomponent. This error simulates subcomponent’s
response delays due to performance problems.
2. Null Call: a called subcomponent is never executed. This error terminates the web
interaction prematurely and the client receives a generic error report, e.g., HTTP
500 internal server error.
3. Runtime Exception: an undeclared exception, or a declared exception that is not
masked by the application, is thrown. As in null calls, the web interaction is
terminated prematurely and the client receives an error report.
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4. Incorrect Message Sequences: an error that occurs for which there is an exception
handler that invokes an error handling sequence. This sequence changes the normal
structure of the web interaction. We emulate this by replacing the calls and returns
in N consecutive subcomponents. The value of N is selected randomly between 1
and 5.
Of these, Pinpoint-PCFG cannot detect response delay errors. We perform
comparative evaluation of Monitor with Pinpoint-PCFG for the other error types.
6.6

Detecting Performance Problems

For this experiment we inject delays to simulate performance problems in the set of
5 subcomponents listed in Table 2..
Table 2. List of subcomponents (component, method) in which performance delays are injected
Name
AccountControllerBean
TxControllerBean
/template/banner.jsp
/bank/accountList.faces
/logon.jsp

Method
createNamedQuery
deposit
JspServlet.service
FacesServlet.service
JspServlet.service

(k=2, Low Load)

Accuracy

1

80% rules

0.5

(k=2, High Load)
1

0

80% rules

60% rules
40% rules

0.5
1 - Precision

60% rules
40% rules

0.5

20% rules

0

Type of Component
EJB
EJB
servlet
servlet
servlet

0

1

20% rules
0.5
1 - Precision

0

1

1

1

0.8

0.8

0.6
μ±σ
μ ± 2σ
μ ± 3σ

0.4
0.2
0

4
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Precision

Accuracy

Fig. 8. ROC curves generated by varying the percentage of rules in Monitor.
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Fig. 9. Accuracy and precision of Monitor in detecting performance delays for three type of
rules.

A category of errors that is difficult to detect is transient errors—those that are
caused by unpredictable random events and that are difficult to reproduce and isolate.
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We want to test Monitor in detecting this category of errors. In order to mimic this
scenario in our injection strategy, we inject delays only 20% of the time a
subcomponent in Table 2. is touched in a web interaction.
Before running the experiment, we determine the best set of parameter values in
Monitor. We generate ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves by varying
their configuration parameters and the imposed load of users to the application. We
use two kinds of loads: low load (4 concurrent users), and high load (20 concurrent
users). Once the ROC curves are generated, we select the operational point as the one
closest to the ideal point (0, 1); in case of a tie, we use the point with the better
precision.
We vary two parameters for Monitor: the size of the rulebase and k in the HMMbased state vector reduction algorithm. Rulebase size is varied by activating randomly
only 20%, 40%, 60% or 80% of the exhaustive list of rules, while k is varied over 1
and 2. Fig. 8. shows the ROC curves for k=2 (k=1 is not shown for lack of space). We
observe that increasing the % of rules increases the accuracy both in low and high
load, while we do not observe a consistent pattern in the variation of precision. The
variation of k does not significantly affect the dispersion of points in the ROC curves.
We select Monitor’s best configuration parameters as rulebase size of 80% and k=2
and use it for the delay error experiments.
For the performance delay rules, first, we measure the average (μ) and standard
deviation (σ) of the response time from the components in the application during the
training phase. We then create rules with the following thresholds for response times
in each component: μ±σ, μ±2σ and μ±3σ.
Fig. 9. shows the results of this experiment. We observe that using μ±2σ provides
the best combination of accuracy and precision. Rules of the type μ±σ provide the
highest accuracy but poor precision, while rules of the type μ±3σ provide accuracy
levels a bit less than μ±2σ and similar precision levels. For rule types μ±σ and μ±2σ
we observe a decrease in accuracy of about 10% as concurrent users are increased
from 4 to 16, and an increase in the same order of magnitude as users are increased to
24. The reason for the increase in accuracy is due to the precision rate that decreases
rapidly after 16 concurrent users. Because of the large rate of false alarms generated
after this point, accuracy is increased as a trade-off. The decrease in precision happens
since when the application is stressed with a high load, the response times increase
naturally, causing Monitor to flag more false alarms. In future, we can improve
precision by making the delay rules adapt to the number of concurrent users.
6.7

Detecting Anomalous Web Interactions

We evaluate Monitor’s performance in detecting anomalous web interactions by
injecting null calls, runtime exceptions and incorrect message sequences. We also
evaluate Pinpoint-PCFG’s performance here.
Monitor detects anomalous web interactions at the StateMaintainer. If an
event is unexpected according to the current state in Monitor’s state vector, an error is
flagged. This avoids the need for explicit rules for this type of detection. For the
Duke’s Bank application, if the correct state is Sc and the state vector after a message
is sampled and pruning is completed, is ω, then we find empirically that in all cases Sc
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∈ ω. Thus, a detection happens at Monitor only if the message is incorrect, i.e., there
is an actual fault. This gives a precision value of 1 for Monitor’s detection of
anomalous web interactions in Duke’s Bank.
For this experiment, first, we empirically determine the best value of parameter k for
the HMM-based state vector reduction algorithm. Fig. 10(a) shows Monitor running
with different values of k while we inject anomalous web interactions. Parameter k=0
represents Monitor running without HMM. We can observe that, with no HMM, in
both low and high loads, accuracy is very low (about 0.4). For k=2 in low load and
k=1 in high load, accuracy reaches its highest value. We observe that as we vary k, for
low load, accuracy remains almost the same (0.9), whereas it decreases substantially
in high load (reaching a minimum of about 0.55). This result validates our design that
HMM is useful in detecting anomalous web interactions since Monitor with k > 0
performs better than with k = 0. In high load, two conditions cause Monitor to have a
decreasing accuracy with increasing k. Monitor samples less often leading to an
increase in the size of ω. With large k, few states get pruned and if the observed
erroneous message is possible in any of the remaining states of ω, the error is not
detected. Second, under high load, when the erroneous message may not be sampled,
the HMM is particularly important. Increasing k effectively reduces the impact of the
HMM, since even states with low probabilities given by the HMM are considered. For
the remaining experiments, we use k=1 as it allows Monitor to have the best accuracy
in both low and high load.
Second, we determine the best configuration parameter setting for Pinpoint-PCFG.
We vary the threshold Mth to get Pinpoint-PCFG’s ROC curves under low and high
load. Fig. 10(b)−(c) show the results of this experiment. A lower value of threshold
generates more false positives. A very high value on the other hand generates missed
alarms. We select Mth = 350 as the operating point for Pinpoint-PCFG.
Fig. 10(d)−(e) show the results for accuracy and precision of Monitor and PinpointPCFG. We observe that on average, Monitor’s accuracy is comparable to PinpointPCFG. In Monitor, accuracy decreases for higher loads due to dropping more
messages in a sampling widow. As the load increases, Pinpoint-PCFG maintains a
high accuracy because it is not dropping messages—messages are being enqueued for
eventual processing. However its latency of detection suffers significantly in high
loads—it is in the order of seconds (Fig. 10(g)) while in Monitor it is in the order of
milliseconds (Fig. 10(f)).
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Fig. 10. Performance results for Monitor and Pinpoint when detecting anomalous web
interactions. (a) Accuracy in Monitor when varying parameter k in the HMM-based state vector
reduction algorithm; (b)−(c) ROC curves for Pinpoint-PCFG where points are generated by
varying the threshold Mth; (d)−(e) Accuracy and precision for Monitor and Pinpoint-PCFG;
(f)−(g)Detection latency for Monitor and Pinpoint-PCFG.

We observe the robustness of Pinpoint-PCFG to false positives as it maintains on
average almost the same precision (0.9) with increasing number of users. However,
the precision in Pinpoint-PCFG is lower than that in Monitor of 1.0.
An important property of a PCFG is that since the grammar is context-free, the
PCFG represents a super-set of the observed web interactions seen in the traces used
for training. Thus it can match some patterns that were not seen in the training phase.
Still there are some patterns that are normal but since they were not seen in the
training phase, generate a false alarm.
We observe that Monitor has a pre-detection latency fraction that varies from 8.93%
to 22.67%, for the different numbers of concurrent users. Pinpoint-PCFG has only
post-detection latency since it needs to see the entire web interaction before flagging
an error.
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The high detection latency in Pinpoint-PCFG is due to the fact that the parsing
algorithm in the PCFG has time complexity O(L3) and space complexity O(RL2),
where R is the number of rules in the grammar and L is the size of a web interaction.
In the Duke’s Bank application we observe that the maximum length of a web
interaction is 256 messages, and the weighted average size is 70. Previous work [18]
has shown that the time to parse sentences of length 40 can be 120 seconds even with
optimized parameters. Moreover, in Pinpoint-PCFG, error detection can only be
performed after the end of web interactions which also explains longer detection
latencies than in Monitor. Another cause of the high latency in Pinpoint-PCFG is the
large amount of virtual memory that the process takes (933.56 MB for a load of 24
concurrent users as shown in Table 3.. This makes the Pinpoint-PCFG process thrash.
6.8

Fine-Grained Detection of Performance Problems

We evaluate the performance of random and intelligent sampling in detecting
performance delays. For this experiment, we use similar definitions for accuracy and
precision as in the previous experiments, but we change the granularity of detection
from web interactions to individual subcomponents. The rationale behind this
changed definition is that IS is expected to instantiate a smaller subset of rules,
relevant to the correct subcomponents, than RS. Thus, if our granularity of detection
is the entire web interaction, then they may perform comparably⎯RS may flag a rule
related to any of the touched subcomponents in the interaction, even a non-faulty
subcomponent. IS, on the other hand, is more likely to flag a rule specifically for the
faulty subcomponent. This difference can be brought out by defining accuracy and
precision at the level of subcomponents. Detection at the level of a subcomponent this
level is helpful in diagnosis—finding the root cause of the problem—since it helps in
pinpointing suspect subcomponents.
Variables I, D, and C are now defined as: I: the subcomponents where faults were
injected; D: the subcomponents in which Monitor detected a failure; C: out of I, the
subcomponents in which Monitor detected a failure (these are the correct detections).
Accuracy and Precision are defined (as in Section 6.3) as |C|/|I| and |C|/|D|.
0.8
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IS-Accuracy
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IS-Precision
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Fig. 11. Accuracy and Precision for Random Sampling and Intelligent Sampling for
performance delay errors.

We inject delays in the same subcomponents used in Section 6.6, while varying the
number of concurrent users. Fig. 11. shows the results of the experiment. We observe
that accuracy and precision are higher for IS for most loads (4−16 concurrent users).
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Although, for high loads (20 and 24 users), random and intelligent sampling exhibit
almost the same (poor) performance.
6.9

Memory Consumption

We measure average memory consumption for Monitor and Pinpoint-PCFG under a
load of 24 concurrent users. Physical and virtual memory usage are collected every 5
seconds by reading the /proc file system and averaged over the duration of each
experimental run. Table 3. shows the results of this experiment. The size of a threedimensional array for each web interaction encountered uses a large amount of virtual
memory for Pinpoint-PCFG.
Table 3. Memory consumption for the compared systems

Monitor
Pinpoint-PCFG

7

Average Memory Usage (MB)
Virtual Memory
Memory in RAM
282.27
25.53
933.56
696.06

Efficient Rule Matching

In order to improve the performance of Monitor, we present a mechanism for
efficient rule matching. As the load in Monitor depends on the processing overhead
per incoming message, reduction in rule matching overhead will result in a reduction
in Monitor’s load. Rules that are computationally expensive are strong candidates for
efficient matching since they cause Monitor to devote most of its resources to them.
Suppose that at time t, a message mt is observed, a rule R has to be matched in the
RuleMatching engine, and a sequence of the n previously observed messages
{mt-n , mt-n+1 ,…, mt-1} are kept in a buffer B. Our efficient rule matching mechanism
works as follows:
1.
2.

Monitor estimates the probability P that, given the previous sequence of
observed messages B, if R is matched, an error will be caught.
If P is greater than a threshold Pth, then R is matched. Otherwise, B becomes
{mt-n+1,…, mt} and the RuleMatching engine goes to the step (1).

The challenge of this mechanism, given a rule R, is to estimate the model for P and
the corresponding threshold value Pth that produce the best results in terms of catching
an error, i.e., that maximize accuracy and precision of detection. While presenting a
general theoretical approach for estimating the model and threshold for any rule is out
of the scope of this paper, we present a simple example in which this technique can be
used to efficiently detect a memory leak in the Apache Tomcat web server[23].
Apache Tomcat is an open-source web server written in Java that implements the Java
Servlet and the JavaServer Pages (JSP) technologies from Sun Microsystems.
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Memory Leak Injection

We instrumented the Apache Tomcat web server source code to inject a memory
leak. Upon receiving a legitimate request, an unused object is created with probability
pleak, and it is kept referenced while the server runs so that it is not taken by the Java
garbage collector. The result is an increase of memory usage that can be observed
from the Java process running the server.
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Fig. 12. Percentage of memory usage of the Apache Tomcat web server under normal
conditions and with a memory leak fault injection.

We perform experiments to observe the pattern of the memory consumption of the
web server in both in normal conditions and when the memory leak is injected. We
use a test-bet of an e-commerce site that simulates the operation of an online store
according the TPC-W benchmark[24]. We use the benchmark WIPSo mixture (50%
browsing and 50% ordering) that is intended to simulate a web site with a significant
percentage of order requests. Fig. 12 shows the results of the experiment when the
probability pleak of the memory leak injection is set to 0.5, and when a load of 50
concurrent users on average is imposed. Measurements are taken in a fixed interval of
1 second for a window of 10 minutes after the server is started.
7.2

Modeling Memory Consumption

Previous work on software rejuvenation[25] has proposed the use of time series
analysis to model memory usage patterns in the Apache web server. In software
rejuvenation techniques, time series analysis is used to understand aging and to
predict when to reboot the server in order to avoid future failures. In this paper, we
use time series analysis to build rules that are able to pinpoint a memory leak and that
help us to demonstrate our efficient rule matching technique. In particular, the web
server memory consumption is modeled as an autoregressive (AR) moving average
(MA) process ARMA(p, q). This process is formally defined as follows[26]:
•

A memory usage measurement Xt is an ARMA(p, q) process if for every
time t,
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where εt is the error term, C is a constant, and {ϕ1, …, ϕp} and {θ1, …, θp}
are the parameters of the model.
•

The error term εt is considered to be white noise, i.e., independently and
identically distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2.

We collect training data in several runs of the Apache Tomcat server for generating
two ARMA(p, q) models λ and λ’ that represent memory usage under normal
conditions and memory leak conditions respectively. The models are inferred by
maximum likelihood estimation by using the statistical tool R[27]. In order to
estimate the number of p and q parameters that best fit the models, whiling trying to
keep these numbers small, we vary p and q over 1, 2, and 3. We then select the
number of p and q that produce the minimum root-mean-square (RMS) error when
comparing test data and new data generated with the models. For our test-bed, p=3
and q=2 resulted in the best configuration for the models.
7.3

Rule Matching Latency Reduction

After the two models λ and λ’ are trained, we build a rule for detecting the memory
leak in the web server by observing to which model the test data fits better. When the
rule is matched at runtime, it takes as input a sequence B of n new observed messages
from the Apache Tomcat web server in which it will look for errors. Then, two
simulated sequences S and S’ are generated from the two models λ and λ′ respectively
using previous observed data values, and they are compared to B by measuring the
RMS error. If B fits better in S’, i.e., its RMS error is less than the one for S, an error
is flag by the rule indicating a possible trend of high memory consumption.
To observe the effectiveness of selectively matching this rule we use a simple
mechanism for evaluating P, the probability of catching the error if the rule is
matched. We use indication of instability in the system as a mechanism for having a
meaningful value of P. We measure the standard deviation σ of the m previous
observed values of memory consumption, and if it is greater than a threshold Pth, then
the rule is matched. Notice that, in order to observe a reduction on the workload of
Monitor, the overhead in evaluating P has to be less than the overhead of evaluating
the whole rule; otherwise it may me better matching the rule directly.
Table 4. Detection coverage and average rule matching delay the ARMA-based rule.

Rule Matching
Criteria

Memory Leak
Detected

Allways matched
σ ≥ 0.5
σ ≥ 1.0

yes
yes
no

Average Matching
Latency (msec)
19.2835
7.1148

1.25
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Table 4. Detection coverage and average rule matching delay the ARMA-based
rule. shows the results for 3 different configurations in Monitor when the memory
leak is injected in the web server: (1) the rule is always matched, (2) the rule is
matched only if σ ≥ 0.5 in the last m messages, and (3) the rule is matched only if σ ≥
1.0 in the last m messages. For the three experiments, m = 5 and the same workload
that we used for training is imposed to the web server. The initial values of 0.5 and
1.0 for σ are taken from the average standard deviation observed in the training data
set for the web server running under normal conditions.
As presented in table 4, in these experiments we observe whether the rule flags the
memory leak, and the average rule matching latency in Monitor, which is defined as
the time spent by Monitor to provide an answer on each incoming message, where the
answer can be either the system is operating normally or an error is detected. We
notice that when the rule is always matched, the average latency is the maximum as
expected, and as we increase σ, the latency decreases. This is due to an inherent
reduction in the chances of matching the ARMA-based rule which is more
computationally expensive than evaluating σ. However, if σ is too low, the error may
not be caught as it is the case when σ=1.0.

8

Related Work

Error Detection in Distributed Systems: Previous approaches of error detection in
distributed systems have varied from heartbeats to watchdogs. However, these
designs have looked at a restricted set of errors (such as, livelocks) as compared to
our work, or depended on alerts from the monitored components.
A recent work closely related to ours is Pinpoint [8]. Authors present an approach
for tracing paths from user requests and use a Probabilistic Context Free Grammar
(PCFG) to model normal path behavior as seen during a training phase. A path’s
structure is then considered anomalous if it significantly deviates from a pattern that
can be derived from the PCFG. Pinpoint however does not consider the problem of
dealing with high rates of requests. We provide a comparative evaluation of Monitor
with Pinpoint in Section 6.7. A variant of the Pinpoint work [22] uses a weighting for
long web interactions so that they are not mistakenly flagged as erroneous. This
weighting seems less useful for Duke’s Bank since the probabilities for the less likely
transitions differ significantly from the expected probability. This work also uses an
additional parameter (α) to pick a particular point in the false alarm-missed alarm
spectrum. We believe that an equivalent effect is achieved through our ROC-based
characterization.
Performance Modeling and Debugging in Distributed Systems: There is recent
activity in providing tools for debugging problems in distributed applications, notably
Project5 [9][10] and Magpie[7]. These approaches provide tools for collecting trace
information at different levels of granularity which are used for automatic analysis,
often offline, to determine the possible root causes of the problem.
Project5’s main goal is detecting performance characteristics in black-box
distributed systems. In [9] models for performance delays on RPC-style and messagebased application for LAN environments are proposed—authors focus on finding
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causal path patterns with unexpected timing or shape. In [10] authors present an
algorithm for performance debugging in wide-area systems. We determined that this
work’s focus is on determining the performance characteristics of different
components in a complete black-box manner. Since Project 5 does not assume a
uniform middleware, such as J2EE, it cannot assign a unique identifier to all messages
in a causal path as they occur. We use the GlassFish-assigned unique identifier to a
path of causal request-responses. In our work, we use both these features. However,
Project5's accuracy suffers greatly when detecting anomalous patterns under
concurrent load (in fairness, this is not the goal of the work either). Therefore, we did
not perform a quantitative comparison with Project5 for detecting performance
problems (in Section 6.6).
The Magpie project [7] is complementary to our work—it is a tool that helps in
understanding system behavior for the purposes of performance analysis and
debugging in distributed applications. Magpie collects CPU usage and disk access for
user requests as they travel though the system components. These models can be used
for capacity planning, performance debugging, and anomaly detection. The workload
models of request behavior can be used in Monitor to specify rules for detection of
performance bottlenecks.
Other powerful tools have also been proposed recently. For example, in [11] authors
present a tool called liblog that aids in recreating the events that occurred prior to and
during failure.
Stateful Intrusion Detection in High Throughput Streams: In the area of intrusion
detection, techniques have been proposed to allow network-based intrusion detection
systems (NIDS) to keep up with high network bandwidths by parallelizing the
workload [1] and by efficient pattern matching [2]. Although distributing the
detection load in multiple machines helps, this does not solve the fundamental
problem of how to manage the resource usage in individual machines, which we
address. This work looks for problems at the network level while we look at
application level deviations from expected behavior.
Sampling Techniques for Anomaly Detection: Recently there is an increased effort
in finding network failures, anomalies and attacks through changes in high-speed
network links. For example, in [3] authors propose a sketch-based approach, where a
sketch is a set of hash tables that models data as a series of (key, value) pairs; key can
be a source/destination IP address, and the value can be the number of bytes or
packets. A sketch can provide accurate probabilistic estimates of the changes in
values for a key. Sampling has also been used in high-speed links as input for
anomaly detection [4][5], for example, for detecting denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
or worm scans. However, some studies show that these sampling techniques introduce
fundamental bias that depredates performance when detecting network anomalies
(e.g., in [6]). Our work matches rules based on aggregated information at the
application level, while this work matches rules based on network level statistics of
the traffic.
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Conclusions and Limitations

This paper presents an intelligent sampling algorithm and an HMM-based technique
to enable stateful error detection in high throughput streams. The techniques are
applied and tested in the Monitor detection system and provide a high quality of
detection (accuracy and precision) for a range of real-world errors in distributed
applications with low detection latency. It compares favorably to an existing detection
system for distributed component-based systems called Pinpoint. We also present a
mechanism for efficiently matching rules that can be computationally expensive
based on the observation that rules will more likely catch errors if instability in the
system is observed.
A disadvantage of our HMM-based technique is that an application with a large
number of states can make the HMM processing too expensive. For the Duke’s Bank
application with 62 states, use of the HMM is beneficial as evidenced by the
improvement in detection precision. Even when our HMM takes as input complete
sequences of messages, the computational cost of this is less than sampling all the
messages. It is a subject of future work to determine what size of the FSM would
cause a cross-over beyond which HMM execution will have to be done with
incomplete sequence of messages, which will call for a novel algorithm itself.
Another limitation of Monitor is that in sampling mode some states may not be
examined. If such a state happens to contain the error condition, Monitor will miss
flagging it since rules associated with that state would not be instantiated. In future
work we will address this problem by developing a sampling scheme that allows
Monitor to preferably sample messages (or sequence of messages) that will point to
erroneous conditions in the application.
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